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In a pre-Napster world Congress sought to promote the
advancement and development of the Internet. To facilitate this
expansion, Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA"), which protects internet service providers from copyright
infringement liability.' Due, in part, to the DMCA, the Internet has
expanded beyond Congress' expectations. With the growth of the
Internet, however, inequities have been created. YouTube
epitomizes these inequities and Viacom's suit highlights the
injustices that have been created. The ease with which copyrighted
materials are published on the Internet has made it impossible for
copyright owners to adequately protect their works. It is time for
Congress to revise the DMCA because the burden on copyright
owners to protect their works from infringement greatly outweighs
the burden placed on service providers.
This Comment discusses the disproportionate burdens
confronted by copyright owners compared to service providers and
the significant changes to the DMCA which are required to alleviate
this problem. Part II explores the history of the DMCA and the rules
that govern its application. Part III examines the lawsuit Viacom
brought against YouTube alleging direct, contributory, and vicarious
copyright infringement. Part IV analyzes YouTube's defense
predicated on the DMCA. Part V offers suggestions to correct the
imbalance in the burden on copyright owners and service providers.
* J.D. 2010 Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. I would like to thank
Professor Rena Seplowitz and the entire Law Review Staff for their help with the editing and
composition of this Comment.
' 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(a) (West 2009).
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II. THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
With the growth of the Internet came concerns about
copyright liability. Congress realized that "the law must adapt in
order to make digital networks safe places to disseminate and exploit
copyrighted materials." 2 It was with this goal in mind that Congress
enacted the DMCA in 1998.3 "The Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA) in Title I implements the World Intellectual Property
(WIPO) treaties on copyright and on performers and phonograms,
and in Title II limits the copyright infringement liability of on-line
and Internet service providers (OSPs and ISPs) under certain
circumstances." 4 This Comment focuses on Title II.
A "service provider" is defined as "a provider of online
services or network access, or the operator of [the] facilities" or "an
entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections
for digital online communications, between or among points
specified by a user, of material of the user's choosing, without
modification to the content of the material as sent or received."5 In
order to protect service providers, a series of safe harbor provisions
were created.6 "These safe harbors provide protection from liability
for: (1) transitory digital network communications; (2) system
caching; (3) information residing on systems or networks at the
direction of users; and (4) information location tools."7 A service
provider must meet the eligibility standards set forth in Section 512(i)
to qualify. Further, safe harbor protection applies only to service
providers that both: (A) maintain and reasonably implement a policy
that allows for the termination of subscribers when they are known
repeat infringers;8 and (B) do not impede on standard technical
measures.9 If the service provider's activity "qualifies for any of the
safe harbors in the DMCA, then it is not liable for any monetary
relief for claims of direct, vicarious or contributory copyright
infringement based on that activity."10
2 S. REP. No. 105-90, at 2 (1998).
Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004).
4 S. REP. No. 105-90, at 8.
17 U.S.C.A. § 512(k)(1)(A)-(B).
6 Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1076 (citing S. REP. No. 105-90, at 19).
See id. at 1076-77 (footnotes omitted); 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (a)-(d).
17 U.S.C.A. § 512(i)(1)(A).
See id. § 512(i)(1)(B).
10 Mark F. Radcliffe, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act: A Retrospective After Three
288 [Vol. 26
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This Comment focuses on the third safe harbor provision,
"information residing on systems or networks at [the] direction of
users."" The third provision exempts a service provider from
liability when it:
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the
material or an activity using the material on the
system or network is infringing; (ii) in the absence of
such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is
apparent; or (iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or
awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or disable
access to, the material; (B) does not receive a financial
benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity,
in a case in which the service provider has the right
and ability to control such activity; and (C) upon
notification of claimed infringement as described in
paragraph (3), responds expeditiously to remove, or
disable access to, the material that is claimed to be
infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.'2
The service provider must also designate an agent to receive take
down notices sent pursuant to the statute by copyright owners. 13
To further understand the statute and its nuances, we can look
at the Ninth Circuit's recent application of the DMCA in Perfect 10,
Inc. v. CCBill L.L.C.14 Perfect 10, publishers of an adult magazine
and owners of the website perfectl0.com, brought suit against CCBill
and CWIE.'" CCBill is a subscription service, in which one can pay
for membership to various sites, and CWIE is a webhost. Perfect 10
alleged that users had posted stolen images onto sites hosted by
CWIE, with memberships paid through CCBill.16 To be eligible for
any of the safe harbors, "a service provider must first meet the
threshold conditions set out in § 512(i)." 7 Section 512(i) requires
Years, 697 PRAc. L. INST. 593, 596 (2002).
" 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c).
12 Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)-(C).
13 See id. § 512(c)(2)-(3).
14 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007).
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that the service provider reasonably implement a system to terminate
subscribers when appropriate.' 8 Implement means "it has a working
notification system, a procedure for dealing with DMCA-compliant
notifications, and .. . it does not actively prevent copyright owners
from collecting information needed to issue such notifications." 9
For the implementation to be "reasonable" the service provider must
terminate users who "repeatedly or blatantly infringe copyright[s]."20
In CCBill, the court held that because CCBill maintained a DMCA
log and kept track of repeat infringers it met the "implements" part of
the "reasonably implements" test.2 1 With respect to the "reasonably"
part of the test, the statute "only requires that a service provider
terminate users who are 'repeat infringers.' "22 In CCBill, the court
determined that Perfect 10 did not comply with the notice
requirement of § 512(c)(3); therefore, CCBill did not have
knowledge of the infringement.23
The remaining questions of the threshold test were whether
CCBill complied with the "red flag test" and interfered with
"standard technical measures." 24 The red flag test provides that: "[A]
service provider may lose immunity if it fails to take action with
regard to infringing material when it is 'aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.' ,25 Due to
an insufficient factual basis, the court remanded to determine if any
red flags had been posed by third parties, which would make CCBill
aware of repeat infringement. 26 "Standard technical measures" are
measures used by copyright owners to find copyrighted works that
are developed by copyright owners and "do not impose substantial
costs on service providers." 27  There was not enough factual
information regarding possible interference with "standard technical
measures," so the issue was remanded.28 On remand, if CCBill failed
the red flag test or was found to interfere with technical measures,
" 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(i)(1)(A).
'9 Perfect 10, 488 F.3d. at 1109.
20 id
21 Id. at 1110-11.
22 Id at 1111.
23 Idatl117.
24 Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1114-15.
25 Id. at 1114 (quoting 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii)).
26 Perect 10, 488 F.3d at 1115.
27 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(i)(2)(C).
28 Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1115.
[Vol. 26290
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then it would not be entitled to safe harbor protections.29
Next, the court evaluated CCBill's case for § 512(c)
protection.30 The first issue was whether CCBill had knowledge or
was aware of the infringement.3' Perfect 1O's notice was earlier
determined to be improper; therefore, it followed that CCBill did not
have knowledge.32 The next issue was whether CCBilI received
"direct financial benefit from the infringing activity." 33 The standard
used in CCBill was the same as the one for vicarious liability,34 and
therefore the relevant question is "whether the infringing activity
[was] a draw for subscribers." 35 The court noted that CCBill did not
receive a direct financial benefit because Perfect 10 had not provided
any real proof of financial benefit.36 The § 512(c) discussion
concluded: "If the district court finds that CWIE meets the threshold
requirements of § 512(i), CWIE is entitled to safe harbor under §
512(c)."
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in CCBill thoroughly
examined the § 512 issues. It began with the threshold test, which
requires that a service provider have a system in place to terminate
subscribers when appropriate, remove infringing materials when
appropriate, and not interfere with standard technical measures
necessary to find both the appropriate subscribers and infringing
materials that should be removed. 39 The court's analysis concluded
with an examination of the test for § 512(c) protection. 40  After
finding that CCBilI was not aware of the infringement and was not
receiving a direct financial benefit, the court concluded that, subject
to passing the threshold test, CCBilI would be protected by §
512(c).4 1
29 Id. at 1113-15.
30 Id. at 1117.
31 id.
32 id.
1 Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1117.
34 See infra Part III(iii) (discussing the standard used).
3 Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1117.
36 Idatl111.
37 id
38 Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1109-18.
3 Id. at 1109, 1114-15.
40 See infra Part IV(B) (discussing the test for § 512(c) protection).
41 Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1118.
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III. VIACOM V. YOUTUBE
Internet use has grown at an incredible rate since 1998.42
YouTube epitomizes this growth hosting seventy-seven million
unique viewers in July 2008,43 more than half the total number of
Internet users in 1998.4 In 1998, YouTube and similar sites did not
exist, as they would have been impractical given the technology at
the time. The slower speeds of the connections in 1998 did not allow
for streaming video.4 5 Thus, the DMCA is ill suited to address the
issues presented by modem technology and sites like YouTube.
Issues arise on mediums such as YouTube when individuals
post content that is not theirs to share freely. The staggering number
of these violations led Viacom to bring a one billion dollar lawsuit
against YouTube for copyright infringement.46 In Viacom's suit
against Google-which wholly owns YouTube-Viacom alleges
Google is liable for direct, contributory, and vicarious copyright
infringement. 47 The results of Viacom's case against YouTube may
cause a tremendous change in the way we use, not only YouTube, but
the Internet as a whole.
An understanding of the allegations brought by Viacom
requires some introduction to the way YouTube functions. Prior to
uploading any content to YouTube, a user must create a free
account. 48  This process is quite simple and can be completed in
under a minute. Once an account is created, a member can upload a
video using videos in several formats.4 9  After "a user uploads a
video, YouTube copies the video in its own software format, adds it
to its own servers, and makes it available for viewing on its own
42 InternetWorldStats.com, Internet Growth Statistics, http://www.internetworldstats.com/
emarketing.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2008) (stating that there were 147 million users in
1998 and 1.46 billion users in 2008).
43 WEBSITEOPTIMIZATION.COM, YOUTUBE DWARFS TOP VIDEO SITES (2008), available at
htT://www.websiteoptimization.com/bw/0808.
IntemetWorldStats.com, Internet Growth Statistics, http://www.internetworldstats.com/
emarketing.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2009) (stating that there were 147 million users in
1998).
45 Michael Russell, Broadband vs. Dial Up, http://ezinearticles.com/?Broadband-vs.-Dial-
Up&id=268857 (last visited Nov. 25, 2009).
e Complaint $ 10, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., No. 07CV02103, 2007 WL
775611 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2007).
47 Id. 47, 74, 83.
48 YouTube.com, Create Your YouTube Account, http://www.youtube.com/signup?next-
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website."50 During this automated process, several thumbnails are
extracted from the video, which are shown to the user when
searching the YouTube site.' When uploading a video, the user adds
tags to make for easier searching.52 According to Google, "[t]ags are
keywords that describe videos. For example, a surfing video might
be tagged with 'surfing,' 'water,' and 'waves.' Users who enjoy
watching surfing videos can then search for any of those terms and
the video associated with these tags will show up in their search
results."53
A. Direct Infringement
Two elements are necessary to prove direct infringement:
ownership and copying of a protectable expression. 54  Viacom's
ownership of the copyrighted material is easily established.55 For the
second element of direct copyright infringement, copying of a
protectable expression, Viacom alleges that the rights to public
display, public performance, and reproduction have been infringed.56
In A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., a monumental case in the
history of copyright law because of its pertinence to the Internet, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the right to reproduction
was violated. The court explained, "users who download files
containing copyrighted music violate plaintiffs' reproduction
rights."5 In YouTube's answer, it "admit[ted] that when a user
uploads a video to the YouTube service, the video is copied into a
software format, stored on YouTube's computers, and made available
for viewing through the YouTube service."60 Videos on YouTube
5o Complaint, supra note 46, 31.
5' Id.
52 id.
5 YouTube.com, YouTube Help Center, Promoting videos: Tags definition,
http://www.google.com/support/youtubelbin/answer.py?hl=en&answer-55769 (last visited
Nov. 25, 2008) (internal quotations omitted).
54 See S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 1989).
55 Complaint, supra note 46, I 43-44 (explaining that Viacom's copyrighted works
include such programming as "The Daily Show," "The Colbert Report," and "South Park").
56 Id. 3 1.
7 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
ssId. at 1013-14
5 Id.
60 Answer T 31, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07CV02103, 2007 WL 1724620
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2007).
2932010]
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are streamed to the user's computer. When data is received, it is
stored in a buffer file and sent to the player to translate into video.62
Through this process, the entire video will be played. Viacom
alleges that it "identified more than 150,000 unauthorized clips of
their copyrighted programming on YouTube."63 Since many of those
videos are unauthorized clips of copyrighted programming, based on
the reasoning in Napster, YouTube is directly infringing on the
copyrights of Viacom.
A defense to direct infringement is fair use.64 To find fair use
the court is guided by four factors: "(1) the purpose and character of
the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the work as a whole;
and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for the work or
the value of the work." 65 The first factor focuses on "whether the
new work merely 'supercede[s] the objects' of the original creation,
... or instead adds . .. a further purpose or different character." 6 6 In
other words, this factor asks "whether and to what extent the new
work is 'transformative.' "67 As part of this element, the court must
determine whether the infringing use is commercial, which would
"weigh[] against a finding of fair use but is not conclusive on the
issue."68 The second factor, nature of the work, asks how creative in
nature the work is. 69 Works that are more creative receive greater
copyright protection. 70 The third factor focuses on the portion used,
which, on its own, does not preclude the defense of fair use even
when the entire work is copied, but it does weigh against a finding of
fair use.7' The fourth factor is the extent to which the work damages
61 YouTube.com, YouTube Help Center, Video Player Issues: The video won't play,
http://www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer-56115 (last visited
Nov. 25, 2008).
62 Ehow.com, How Does a Streaming Video Work, http://www.ehow.comlhow-
does_4564632 streaming-video-work.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2008).
63 Complaint, supra note 46, 3.
6 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014; see also 17 U.S.C.A § 107 (West 2009).
65 Napster, 329 F.3d at 1014 (internal quotation omitted).
66 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (internal citations
omitted).
67 id
68 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1015.
69 Id. at 1016.
70 id
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the present or future market for the original work.72
In its answer, Google raises the defense of fair use.73
Similarly, in Napster, "Napster contend[ed] that its users do not
directly infringe plaintiffs' copyrights because the users are engaged
in fair use of the material." 74 With respect to the first factor, purpose
and character of the use, the Napster court concluded "that
downloading . . . files does not transform the copyrighted work ....
[The court is] reluctant to find fair use when an original work is
merely retransmitted in a different medium." 75  Applying this
principle to YouTube, the alleged use of Viacom's copyrighted clips
through retransmission in other formats is not a transformative use.
As part of this element, the court will have "to determine whether the
allegedly infringing use is commercial."76 A showing of repeated
copying of copyrighted works is sufficient to demonstrate a
commercial use, even without the sale of the works. While there
will be further examination of the financial benefit Google receives
from the allegedly copyrighted materials, it is clear that a court could
reasonably find that there was a commercial use without it."
The second factor is nature of the work.79 In Napster, the
court found that "copyrighted musical compositions and sound
recordings are creative in nature . . . which cuts against a finding of
fair use."80 Following that logic, there is no reason to believe that
copyrighted video, television programming, or movie clips, are any
less creative; therefore, contradicting a finding of fair use.
The third factor focuses on the portion of the material used.'
Although the court in Hustler concluded that copying the whole file
did not preclude the defense of fair use, it explained that this would
hurt a fair use argument.82 While YouTube limits the length of
72 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1016.
7 Answer, supra note 60, T 7.
74 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014.
71 Id. at 1015.
76 Id.
n See Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, 227 F.3d 1110, 1118
(9th Cir. 2000) (stating that the church that copied religious text for its members
"unquestionably profit[ed]" from the unauthorized "distribution and use of [the text] without
having to account to the copyright holder").
7 See infra Part III(B)(a).
7 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014.
s0 Id. at 10 16 (internal quotation omitted).
'8 Id. at 1014.
82 Hustler Magazine Inc., 796 F.2d at 1155.
2010] 295
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uploaded videos to ten minutes, users are still able to upload three
separate ten minute videos in order to post a full half hour television
show or several more in order to post a full movie.13 Similarly, using
a small portion of a work, which amounts to the "heart" of the work,
weighs against a finding of fair use.84 Without posting a whole
episode or movie, a ten minute video could take the place of the full
episode or movie if the "heart" of the work has been copied.
The fourth factor is impact on "the potential market for the
[original] work."85 Viacom alleges that it found 150,000 infringing
video clips, and that this caused damage to the market for the works
because it was posted to YouTube before it could be sold.86 It uses
the example of "An Inconvenient Truth" being posted in its entirety
before it could be sold on DVD." If just the one example of "An
Inconvenient Truth" were subject to widespread reproduction before
a DVD was released, there would clearly be a "substantial impact on
the market for the original."8 In sum, all four factors militate against
a finding of fair use.
Google may also try to defend itself by stating that the
services YouTube provides are passive. "As to direct infringement,
liability is ruled out for passive, automatic acts engaged in through a
technological process initiated by another."89 At a preliminary
hearing, Google explained that the search function, for instance, uses
an automatic algorithm and does not favor infringing materials over
non-infringing ones.90 While this could be a valid argument,
YouTube is not simply a passive service provider. In Netcom, the
court explained that "a system that automatically . . . creates
temporary copies of all the data sent through it is" passive." The
court relates it to a copy machine. YouTube does not just copy the
files but "copies the video in its own software format, adds it to its
own servers, and makes it available for viewing on its own
83 YouTube.com, YouTube Help Center, Learn More: Longer Videos,
http://www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer-71673 (last visited
Nov. 25, 2008).
84 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587.
8s Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014.
86 Complaint, supra note 46, TT 3, 44.
87 Id. 144.
88 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 1999).
89 ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 622 (4th Cir. 2001).
90 Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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website." 92 YouTube also takes several thumbnails from the video
provided to the user when searching for a video, which has been
indexed by the tags provided by the uploader. 93 Once uploaded, the
file is in YouTube's format, on its servers and available for viewing
by users who use its search function; this does not sound like the
"passive, automatic act" the court meant to protect.
B. Contributory Infringement
Viacom next alleged contributory infringement. 94  "[O]ne
who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be
held liable as a 'contributory' infringer." 95  A dissection of this
statement indicates that the plaintiff must show that the defendant
had knowledge of the infringement, and materially contributed to the
infringing conduct.
It was reported that when Google purchased YouTube for
$1.65 billion it set aside money to fund legal costs because it
recognized the possibility that YouTube may face lengthy court
battles. 6 Google has also entered into costly licensing agreements
with more than one thousand small and large media companies, in
exchange for either ad revenue 97 or use of filtering technology to
remove copyrighted materials.98 In the last year, a research group at
MIT has monitored videos that have been taken down from the
YouTube site.99 It determined that more than 45,000 videos have
been removed with over 9000 of those being removed due to take-
down notices by copyright owners. 00 With this being just a small
percentage of the videos that have been removed, it is hard to believe
92 Complaint, supra note 46, 31.
93 id.
94 Id. 74.
9 Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971) (internal footnote omitted).
96 See ANNE BROACHE, VIACOM SUES GOOGLE OVER YOUTUBE CLIPS (2007),
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9588_22-151503.html.
9 See Miguel Helft, Google Aims to Make YouTube Profitable with Ads, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 22, 2007, at Cl.
98 Complaint, supra note 46, 7.
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Google can say it did not have knowledge of infringement.''
A more difficult question is whether the court will find that
Google is materially contributing to the infringement. In Fonovisa,
Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc. ,102 the court found "it would be difficult
for the infringing activity to take place in the massive quantities
alleged without the support services provided by [Cherry
Auction]."'o "These services include, inter alia, the provision of
space, utilities, parking, advertising, plumbing, and customers."1 04
Also, "providing the site and facilities for known infringing activity
is sufficient to establish contributory liability."'0o In the instant case,
YouTube provides the support services by converting the videos into
its format and then storing them on its servers. It is estimated that
YouTube spends one million dollars a day just on bandwidth.106 The
alleged massive quantity of infringement could not occur without
YouTube because the average user could not afford even a small
portion of that cost.
Therefore, subject to the DMCA defense,'07 YouTube should
be found liable for contributory infringement.
C. Vicarious Infringement
Vicarious infringement, the next allegation, imposes liability
even if the service provider is unaware of the infringement. "[O]ne
may be vicariously liable if he has the right and ability to supervise
the infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such
activities." 0 8  In order to prove vicarious liability, both direct
financial benefit and the right and ability to supervise must be
present.'09 These elements are commonly referred to as "control and
benefit.""o
101 Id.
102 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
103 Id. at 264.
10 Id.
105 Id. (citing WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW & PRACTICE 1147 (1994) (stating that
"[m]erely providing the means for infringement may be sufficient" to incur contributory
copyright liability).
106 Yi-Wyn Yen, YouTube Looks for the Money Clip, CNNMONEY.COM, Mar. 25, 2008,
http://techland.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2008/03/25/youtube-looks-for-the-money-clip/.
107 See infra Part III.
108 Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162.
'" Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263.
110 See Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1327 (D.
298 [Vol. 26
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"[D]efendants are found to have 'control' over a performance
if they 'either actively operate or supervise the operation of the place
wherein the performances occur, or control the content of the
infringing program.' "1" In Polygram, the control element was
found based on two facts: "(1) Interface exercised authority and
control over its exhibitors through its Rules and Regulations and (2)
the exhibitors were bound to follow these rules."ll 2 In Napster, the
court found with respect to control that Napster
has the ability to locate infringing material listed on its
search indices, and the right to terminate users' access
to the system. The file name indices, therefore, are
within the 'premises' that Napster has the ability to
police. We recognize that the files are user-named
and may not match copyrighted material exactly ....
For Napster to function effectively, however, file
names must reasonably or roughly correspond to the
material contained in the files, otherwise no user could
ever locate any desired music.1 13
Similarly, YouTube uses its Terms of Service in order to
exercise control.114  Under section two of the terms, simply
employing the services provided by YouTube binds the user to the
Terms of Service." 5 YouTube, also in the Terms of Service, reserves
the right to remove videos or users at its own discretion."16 A user,
who uploads a video to the site, is bound by the terms of service and
grants YouTube a non-exclusive license to the work."'7 Under the
test provided by Polygram, YouTube is vicariously liable because
control is gained by YouTube through the Terms of Service. The
findings of Napster are on point with what is occurring on YouTube
and bolsters this decision. Instead of file names, YouTube users
provide the site with tags that have to "reasonably or roughly
Mass. 1994).
"n Id. at 1328 (citation omitted) (emphasis in the original).
112 id
"' Napster, 239 F.3d at 1024.
114 YouTube.com, YouTube Terms of Service, http://www.youtube.com/t/terms (last
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correspond to the material contained in the files[J" otherwise the
videos would never be located or watched.' 18  YouTube has the
ability to monitor these terms using filters, which it does for
companies that license the material to it.119 Therefore, YouTube
should be found to have satisfied the element of control of the
infringing activity for vicarious liability.
In Fonovisa, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that
vicarious liability should be imposed on "the operator of a business
where infringing performances enhance the attractiveness of the
venue to potential customers."l 20 Forbes estimates that YouTube will
generate approximately $200 million in ad revenue this year.121
Viacom has been granted access to the records of YouTube so that it
can show that infringing content makes up a substantial portion of the
total content on YouTube.122 In Polygram, the United States District
Court found financial benefit due to the use of a copyrighted song at
five of the over 2000 booths of the swap meet where the total gross
revenue was merely forty-four million dollars. 123  The court
explained that "[e]ven if only one exhibitor played music for only
one hour, the benefit to Interface could be very substantial."l 24 Even
on the limited sample taken by researchers at MIT, there have been
665 videos removed from YouTube by Viacom.125 Twelve of those
videos have been viewed more than one million times, several of
which are music videos taken directly from MTV, one of Viacom's
copyrights.126 Also significant is Google's purchase of YouTube for
$1.65 million, 27 indicating that Google intends to profit from
YouTube. Taking everything into account, YouTube has clearly
benefited financially from the infringing material.
Therefore, similar to contributory infringement, subject to the
11s Napster, 239 F.3d at 1024.
119 Complaint, supra note 46, 17.
120 Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263.
121 Quentin Hardy & Evan Hessel, Gootube, FORBES.COM, June 16, 2008,
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2008/0616/050.html.
2 Viacom Int'l Inc., 253 F.R.D. at 261.
123 Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1331.
124 Id. at 1333.
125 Youtomb.mit.edu, YouTomb Statistics, http://youtomb.mit.edu/statistics (last visited
Nov. 20, 2008).
126 Youtomb.mit.edu, YouTomb Statistics, http://youtomb.mit.edu/statistics (follow
"down:copyright:Viacom International Inc." hyperlink; then, follow "view" hyperlink).
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DMCA defense,128 YouTube should be held liable for vicarious
copyright infringement.
IV. DMCA: GOOGLE'S MAIN DEFENSE
If an Internet service provider "qualifies for any of the safe
harbors in the DMCA, then it is not liable . . . for claims of direct,
vicarious or contributory copyright infringement based on that
activity." 29 Therefore, in the name of efficiency, several courts have
determined whether a defendant qualified for safe harbor protection
under the DMCA before discussing liability. 3 0
A. Threshold Test
To be protected by the DMCA safe harbor provisions, Google
must first meet the threshold requirements of the DMCA.'l Thus, "it
must be a 'service provider' and it must adopt . .. a policy providing
that it may, in appropriate circumstances, terminate the accounts of
repeat infringers."l3 2  And, "the service provider is obliged to
accommodate, and must not interfere with, 'standard technical
measures' used by copyright owners to identify or protect
copyrighted works."1 33
Is YouTube a "service provider?" 34 In its complaint, Viacom
argues that "the YouTube conduct ... is not simply providing storage
space, conduits, or other facilities to users . . . . [but] [t]o the
contrary, YouTube itself commits the infringing duplication, public
performance, and public display of Plaintiffs' copyrighted works." 3 5
"Generally, these liability limitations apply only to passive activities,
where the ISP does not exercise any control over, or interact with, the
content of the infringing material." 36 Most courts have interpreted
128 See infra Part III.
129 Radcliffe, supra note 10, at 596.
130 See Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1098 (W.D. Wash.
2004); lo Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1141 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
131 Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1098.
132 Veoh, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1142 (citation omitted).
133 Id. at 1142-43 (citation omitted).
134 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(k)(1)(A)-(B) (defining "service provider").
135 Complaint, supra note 46, 31.
136 Christopher Paul Boam, The Internet, Information, and the Culture of Regulatory
Change: A Modern Renaissance, 9 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 175, 187 (2001).
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the definition of "service provider" broadly. 'n If the court finds that
Google is not a "service provider," then the DMCA safe harbor
defense will fail.
Assuming Google is found to be a "service provider," the
next question is whether Google "adopted and reasonably
implemented . . . a policy that provides for the termination in
appropriate circumstances of . . . repeat infringers;" and
"accommodates and does not interfere with standard technical
measures."' 3 8 YouTube has an automated system in place that takes
down videos whenever a take-down notice is sent; 139 however,
Viacom argues that this is not enough.140 Viacom alleges that repeat
infringers who are removed can create a new account under a
different name and YouTube has no mechanism to prevent this
abuse.141 Viacom's successful motions to compel production of
several records of YouTube should prove whether this occurs 4 2 and,
if so, would demonstrate that YouTube's policy for terminating
repeat infringers is ineffectual. The district court in Corbis v.
Amazon, however, found that "[t]he mere fact that [the repeat
infringer] appeared on zShops under a different user name and
identity does not, by itself, create a legitimate question of fact
regarding the procedural implementation of Amazon's termination
policy." 43 This policy, if followed, would seem to help YouTube's
case, but the Amazon Court did not decide what would happen if this
were done by a large number of users. Widespread creation of new
user aliases by repeat infringers after their termination would render
the termination policy essentially useless. Congress, in using the
words "reasonably implements," did not intend for such an easy
workaround to occur.
Whether YouTube "interferes with standard technical
measures," is another point in dispute. Viacom argues that
YouTube's search function interferes with such measures because it
137 See Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1098 (W.D. Wash.
2004); Veoh, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1142-43.
13 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(i)(1)(A)-(B).
1 Google Copyright Blog: Automation in Takedowns, http://googlecopyright.blogspot.
com/2007/04/automation-in-takedowns.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2008).
140 Complaint, supra note 46, 6.
141 Id. T 41.
142 Viacom Int'l Inc., 253 F.R.D. at 259.
143 Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1104.
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only identifies one thousand clips for any search.'" It also argues
that YouTube, by allowing people to make items available only to
friends, a private use, deters it from finding infringing materials.14 5
These conclusions have led Viacom to believe that "no matter how
much effort and money copyright owners expend to protect their
rights, there will always be a vast collection of infringing videos on
YouTube."l46 With respect to Viacom's allegations, YouTube can
argue that allowing search results to be unlimited would impose
"substantial costs on service providers or substantial burdens on their
systems or networks" and it, therefore, does not need to expand its
searches to be in compliance with the DMCA.147  While limiting
searches to one thousand results is a reasonable technical measure,
keeping items private is not. This measure could make it impossible
for a copyright owner to find infringements, and therefore should be
considered interference with standard technical measures.
The next part of the threshold test as defined by CCBill is the
red flag test.14 8 Viacom, in its complaint, directly commented on red
flags when it alleged "YouTube's site is also filled with 'red flags'
from which infringing activity is apparent, such as description terms
and search tags using Plaintiffs' well-known trademarks."l 49 This
may be compounded by the recent reports of the effectiveness of
filtering used by NBC, one of YouTube's partners, for Olympic
coverage.150 Although imperfect,' 5 ' YouTube should enable filtering
technology for known copyrights or at least apply them after a
takedown notice has been sent to keep similar material off the site.
In a similar case, Io Group v. Veoh Networks, the United
States District Court, in examining the threshold test, found that
"Veoh (a) has a working notification system, (b) has a procedure for
dealing with DMCA-compliant notifications, and (c) does not
actively prevent copyright owners from collecting information
necessary to issue such notices." 5 2  With respect to blocking
'" Complaint, supra note 46,143.
145 id.
146 id
147 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(i)(2)(C).
148 CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1114.
149 Complaint, supra note 46, 36.
Iso See Janko Roettgers, Youtube Filters 75-80 Percent Accurate, NEWTEEVEE, Nov. 6,
2008, http://newteevee.com/2008/l1/06/youtube-filters-75-80-percent-accurate-nbcu-exec/.
152 Veoh, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1145.
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previously infringing content, "Veoh does track content that has been
identified as infringing and permanently blocks that content from
ever being uploaded by any user."' Based on these findings, the
court held that Veoh met the threshold requirements.154  In
YouTube's case, Viacom does not argue that YouTube's notification
system is inadequate. It does argue that YouTube's procedure for
dealing with the notifications is ineffectual because "users routinely
alter as little as a frame or two of a video and repost it."' 5 5 In ALS
Scan, the court explained that "the notification requirements are
relaxed to the extent that, with respect to multiple works, not all must
be identified-only a 'representative' list."15 6 "[T]he requirements of
a notification does not seek to burden copyright holders with the
responsibility of identifying every infringing work---or even most of
them-when multiple copyrights are involved. Instead, the
requirements are written as to reduce the burden of holders of
multiple copyrights who face extensive infringement of their
works."' 57 This approach, which looks to the intent of the DMCA
and better balances the burdens placed on copyright holders and
service providers, should apply. Viacom complains that YouTube
does not comply with the requirements set out in ALS Scan stating:
"[YouTube] removes only the specific infringing clips at the specific
web addresses (URLs) identified in a takedown notice, rather than all
infringing works that can be reasonably located using the
representative lists and other information in the notice."'15 8 Following
the decision in Veoh, YouTube is more likely to meet the threshold
test of the DMCA. But if the more expansive view in ALS Scan with
respect to notice is used, then this may jeopardize YouTube's
protection under the safe harbors.
B. Section 512(c) Protection
YouTube seeks to protect itself from liability with the "at the
direction of users" safe harbor under § 512(c).'5 9 The most difficult
154 Id. at 1147.
155 Complaint, supra note 46, 40.
1s6 ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 625.
157 Id.
1ss Complaint, supra note 46, 41.
159 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c).
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issues for the court arise under § 512(c)(1)(B) and § 512(c)(1)(A): (a)
whether YouTube "receive[s] a financial benefit directly attributable
to the infringing activity;" 60 (b) if a direct financial benefit occurs,
does YouTube have the ability to control the infringing activities;161
(c) does YouTube have actual or apparent knowledge of the
infringement;162 and (d) if YouTube does have knowledge, does it
then remove the content expeditiously?1 63
1. Direct Financial Benefit
Whether YouTube receives a direct financial benefit from the
infringing activity may be the most important issue in the case. It
may also be one of the hardest issues for the court to decide. One
consistently cited source of case law that defines direct financial
benefit is Fonovisa.164 In Fonovisa, the Ninth Circuit found direct
financial benefit existed when "infringing performances enhance the
attractiveness of the venue to potential customers."16 5 When this test
was applied to the particular facts of Fonovisa, the court stated "the
sale of pirated recordings . . . is a 'draw' for customers," and
therefore provided a direct financial benefit.166 The court in CoStar
Group v. Loopnet disagreed.167 In CoStar, the United States District
Court used a narrow interpretation based on the plain language of the
statute.168 It decided that for a direct financial benefit to exist the
benefit must be "directly attributable to the infringing activity."' 69
Taking such a narrow approach is impractical and provides too little
protection for copyright owners. The courts in Napster,o7 1 CCBill,'7 '
and Veohl 72 all followed the reasoning from Fonovisa.
Viacom alleges that YouTube receives a direct financial
160 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1)(B).
161 Id.
162 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1)(A).
163 id.
16 Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263 (demonstrating that Fonovisa was a vicarious liability case,
where the DMCA was not applicable).
16 Id.
166 id.
167 CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 705 (D. Md. 2001).
168 id.
169 Id. (citing 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1)(B)).
170 239 F.3d at 1023.
17' 488 F.3d at 1117.
172 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1151.
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benefit from its conduct.173 In its complaint Viacom alleges that
"YouTube derives advertising revenue directly attributable to the
infringing works, because advertisers pay YouTube to display banner
advertising to users whenever they log on to, search for, and view
infringing videos."l 74 In accordance with the findings of Fonovisa,
Viacom stated that copyrighted materials were used "to draw
millions of users to [YouTube's] website." 75 Based upon the Costar
standard, Viacom will argue that YouTube realizes a direct financial
benefit attributable to the infringing content.'76  However, this
standard will be more difficult for Viacom to satisfy. Since Viacom
alleges such a large amount of infringing materials, it must show that
the ads that are presented on the YouTube homepage as well as on
the various search pages are sources of direct financial benefit to
YouTube. The standard articulated in Fonovisa will likely be used
by the Second Circuit because of its wide adoption in recent cases
and the impracticability of determining what profits are directly
attributable to infringing content in a web environment. Under the
Fonovisa standard, a court should find that YouTube is receiving a
direct financial benefit from the infringing content.
2. Right and Ability to Control
A finding of direct financial benefit on its own does not bar
safe harbor protection. If the court finds that YouTube receives a
direct financial benefit from the infringing activities and has the right
and ability to control the infringement, then it will be barred from
using § 512(c). In Hendrickson v. eBay, the United States District
Court explained that "the 'right and ability to control' the infringing
activity, as the concept is used in the DMCA, cannot simply mean the
ability of a service provider to remove or block access to materials
posted on its website or stored in its system."' 7 7 In determining that
eBay did not have control over the infringing material, the court
found that "eBay is not actively involved in the listing, bidding, sale
and delivery of any item offered for sale on its website." 7 8
173 Complaint, supra note 46, 13 7.
174 id.
176 Costar, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 705.
17 Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1093 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
178 Id. at 1094.
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In contrast, although dealing with the control element from a
vicarious infringement perspective, the Ninth Circuit in Napster
found that "Napster retains the right to control access to its
system." 79 It reasoned that, "Napster has an express reservation of
rights policy, stating on its website that it expressly reserves the
'right to refuse service and terminate accounts . .. if Napster believes
that user conduct violates applicable law . . . or for any reason in
Napster's sole discretion, with or without cause.' "80 In order to
protect itself from liability, Napster's "reserved right to police must
be exercised to its fullest extent . . .. [because] [tiurning a blind eye
to detectable acts of infringement for the sake of profit gives rise to
liability.""'
Hendrickson and Napster both fall onto a continuum with one
end being no right and ability to control and the other being total
right and ability to control. Hendrickson would be placed
somewhere on the left of this continuum, while Napster would fall
somewhere on the right of the continuum. YouTube, like Napster,
will fall on the right side and the court should find that YouTube has
the right and ability to control infringing materials on its site.
YouTube's Terms of Service state that when uploading a video "you
hereby grant YouTube a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free,
sublicenseable and transferable license to use, reproduce, distribute,
prepare derivative works of, display, and perform the User
Submissions." 82 It also states that "YouTube may remove such User
Submissions and/or terminate a User's access for uploading such
material in violation of these Terms of Service at any time, without
prior notice and at its sole discretion." l83 Based on the court's
findings in Hendrickson, this alone does not imply that YouTube has
control.184 YouTube does not simply monitor, as Viacom alleges, it
determines who it protects from infringement based on whether the
copyright owner enters a licensing agreement.'8 5
YouTube is easily distinguishable from eBay. YouTube is
actively involved in the posting and listing of the infringing content.
" Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023.
180 id.
181 Id.
182 YouTube.com, YouTube Terms of Service, http://www.youtube.com/t/terms (last
visited Nov. 20, 2008).
183 Id.
184 Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1094.
185 Complaint, supra note 46, T 7.
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It converts the file, extracts images, and stores the file and images on
its own servers.'16  It is also taking a license in the file "to use,
reproduce, distribute, prepare derivative works of, display, and
perform."" Another difference between eBay and YouTube is that
YouTube has the ability to inspect the videos that are posted to its
site; eBay, however, could not inspect the products offered for sale.
Since "YouTube proactively reviews and removes pornographic
videos from its library," Viacom questions why the same cannot be
done with infringing videos.' 8 8 Although the decision of whether a
video infringes the copyright laws is much harder than whether a
video contains pornographic content, this does not explain why
blatantly infringing materials cannot be removed prior to their being
made publicly available.
The Napster court explained that "[t]urning a blind eye to
detectable acts of infringement for the sake of profit gives rise to
liability."l 89 In its complaint, Viacom repeatedly implies that this is
exactly what YouTube is doing.19 0 By requiring copyright owners to
provide YouTube with licenses, YouTube is trying to profit directly
from the infringing videos.19' Many of these agreements also allow
YouTube to place ads in or around the videos.192 Viacom also alleges
that were it not for the infringing materials, YouTube would lose a
substantial number of its users, thereby losing ad revenue. 19 The
court in ALS Scan stated that "[t]he DMCA's protection of an
innocent service provider disappears at the moment the service
provider loses its innocence." 94 YouTube's inaction for the sake of
profit, along with the other elements of control, removes its
innocence as a service provider.
186 Answer, supra note 60, 31.
187 YouTube.com, YouTube Terms of Service, http://www.youtube.com/t/terms (last
visited Nov. 20, 2008).
188 Complaint, supra note 46, 1 38.
19 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023.
190 Complaint, supra note 46, 3, 6, 8, 28.
191 See Candace Lombardi, YouTube Cuts Three Content Deals, CNET, Oct. 9, 2006,
htt.://news.cnet.com/YouTube-cuts-three-content-deals/2100-1030 3-6123914.html.
I2 Id
193 Complaint, supra note 46, 6.
194 ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 625.
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3. Actual or Apparent Knowledge
The knowledge requirement of § 512(c) is consistent with the
knowledge requirement under the threshold test of § 512(i). 195
Pursuant to § 512(c)(1)(A), the service provider cannot have actual
knowledge of infringement or "in the absence of such actual
knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which
infringing activity is apparent."l 96 If the service provider does have
knowledge then the only way for it to still be protected by the safe
harbors of § 512(c) is if it acts expeditiously to remove the material
when it obtains that knowledge.' 97 The court, in Veoh, broke this
down into two categories: (1) "Actual Knowledge of Infringing
Activity"; and (2) "Apparent Infringing Activity." 98 Since Io Group
did not send any take down notices, the court found that there was no
actual knowledge because notice was not adequately provided of the
infringement. 199 For apparent infringing activities, the court looked
to Corbis stating that " 'the question is whether the service provider
deliberately proceeded in the face of blatant factors of [infringement
of] which it was aware.' "200 It further clarified that " 'apparent
knowledge requires evidence that a service provider 'turned a blind
eye to 'red flags' of obvious infringement.' 201
Does YouTube have actual knowledge of infringement? In
Veoh, the court found that there was not actual knowledge because of
the lack of adequate notice.202 In this case it is clear that there was
adequate notice. Viacom sent YouTube 100,000 take down notices
after negotiations failed between the two. 203 This provided YouTube
with adequate knowledge of infringing materials. For the safe harbor
to apply, YouTube would have to "act expeditiously to remove, or
disable access to, the material." 204
195 Veoh, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1144.
196 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
197 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1)(C).
198 Veoh, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1148.
199 Id
200 Id. (quoting Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1108).
201 Id. (quoting Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1108).
202 Veoh, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1148.
203 Steve Bryant, Viacom Orders Google to Remove 100,000 YouTube Videos,
GOOGLEWATCH, Feb. 2, 2007, http://googlewatch.eweek.com/contentlyoutube/viacom_
ordersgoogle to remove 100000_youtube videos.html.
204 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (c)(1)(A)(iii).
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4. Remove Infringing Materials Expeditiously
Since YouTube will likely be found to have actual
knowledge, and, as discussed previously, may also be found to have
apparent knowledge, YouTube will have to prove that it "act[ed]
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the [infringing]
material." 205 If YouTube was only required to remove the infringing
material stated in the takedown notices, then it would clearly be
protected due to its system which automatically takes down videos
when notices are sent. However, the court in ALS Scan explained
that for removal not all works need to be identified, only a
'representative' list.206 As the court explained, this is done in order to
achieve a balance of responsibilities between the service provider and
the copyright owner.207 It seems that this is the critical issue in this
case; neither side wants to spend the money needed to properly stop
the infringement and both sides argue that the burden is too great.
V. CONCLUSION
It appears clear that YouTube will be found liable for
copyright infringement. YouTube's main defense is the § 512(c) safe
harbor under the DMCA.208 Conflicting opinions exist as to what
standards must be met before the safe harbors apply.209 When the
DMCA was created, the expansion of service providers and the
production of faster service were of greater import than the rights of
the copyright owner. At the time, this preference seemed legitimate
because, at the Internet speeds in 1998, mass infringement was
unlikely, if not impossible, for video content; however, with such
contemporary technology such as broadband internet and streaming
video, infringement occurs in alarming amounts.
Even if Viacom and Google come to a settlement and enter
into a licensing agreement, this discussion is important because other
cases will arise that require the resolution of these issues. Therefore,
Congress should amend the DMCA to make the burden on service
providers comparable to the burden on copyright owners. In its
205 id
206 ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 625.
207 id.
208 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c).
209 See Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082; Napster, 239 F.3d 1004.
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current form, the DMCA merely requires the service provider to
abide by take down requests of the copyright owner. 210  With the
expansion of the Internet and the speed at which the copyrighted
materials may be distributed and reproduced, the burden on the
copyright owner is far too great.
This burden may be alleviated in several ways. The
legislature may make the fair use exception simpler to apply in cases
dealing with a DMCA issue. If lay people could understand what a
fair use is, they would be more likely to find a way to come within
the fair use protections, rather than infringing on the copyright
owner's content. In the case of YouTube, even if an automated
method were impossible, YouTube would be able to train employees
to recognize what is not fair use of a copyright and would then be
able to remove infringing works. Under current law, YouTube could
not do so because even lawyers educated in the fair use doctrine can
disagree as to whether it applies.21'
Another way to alleviate some of the burden on copyright
holders would be to expand on the ideas provided in ALS Scan and
amend the DMCA to explicitly explain the proper rule. Takedown
notices need to be "substantially" comporting to the format provided
in § 512(c)(3)(A).212 The Fourth Circuit found that when multiple
infringing works exist not all must be identified, but only a
'representative' list.213 In YouTube's case, if a few takedown notices
were sufficient to remove a large number of videos, it would reduce
the burden that is currently imposed on Viacom of pointing out every
infringing video.
Alternatively, the market may solve this problem. Services
such as Hulu, created by News Corp. and NBC, are earning profits
due to advertising.21 4 While YouTube is only selling advertising on
three to four percent of its videos viewed, Hulu is able to sell
advertisements on eighty percent of its videos because it has licenses
to do so. 2 15 YouTube cost Google $1.65 billion dollars to purchase
210 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c).
211 Timothy B. Lee, Fair Use Gets a Fair Shake: YouTube Tot to Get Day in Court, ARS
TECHNICA, Aug. 21, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080821-fair-use-gets-a-
fair-shake-youtube-tot-to-get-day-in-court.html.
212 ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 625.
213 id
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and is "bleeding cash" by providing videos from which it cannot
make any profit.2 16 Many other large copyright holders have taken
the hint and have started providing their videos with advertising on
their own sites. 2 17 This could spell the end for sites like YouTube if
the legislature does not act promptly.
216 id.
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